by Greg Goode
Coming soon!
What if the world we call “physical” is not physical at all?
Enlightening the Physical World explores a common anti-materialist view of the world shared by the eighteenth-century philosopher George Berkeley and the twentieth-century Direct Path inspired by Sri Atmananda Krishna Menon. Both approaches point to the same insight: Our familiar belief in an independently existing material world cannot withstand careful scrutiny.
This book examines Berkeley’s most engaging work, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713), emphasizing useful insights for Direct Path inquiry into so-called physical objects. Through this shared perspective, readers are invited to reconsider what the “physical world” really means.
Preface
This is a study guide for George Berkeley’s 1713 book, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists. It is an expanded version of a much shorter PDF file I prepared in 2017 for the Direct Path group on Facebook. That PDF version was much less detailed and discussed only the first of the three dialogues. It proved helpful to people working with the Direct Path, and I had promised to follow up with a monograph covering the second and third dialogues. This is it.
The purpose of this book is to examine the major arguments in Berkeley’s text from the perspective of a Direct Path inquirer. How can Berkeley’s eighteenth-century insights help the contemporary nonduality student trying to deconstruct the notion that the physical world is objectively existent? There are many ways. I find Berkeley’s ideas to be amazingly relevant and helpful. He considers many of the same questions that nonduality students ask.
Why is the issue of physicality so important? For so many people who look into Direct Path inquiry, physical stuff seems the most real. In terms of Direct Path teaching, physicality occupies about 30% of the subject matter, but 90% of the difficulty. Physical stuff seems to be the most serious exception to nonduality’s teaching that consciousness is all there is. For the nonduality inquirer, everyday experience in and around the physical world seems to contradict nonduality.
Also, because physicality is such an important part of our thinking, we tend to apply physical metaphors to nonphysical things, and perhaps even take these metaphors literally. We can think of the mind as a physical container, with some things inside it and more things outside. If we say we have a mental block, we may visualize curtains or walls physically dividing different spaces. We may think of “reasonable ideas” as spatially gathered into a privileged inner circle, with “unreasonable ideas” relegated to the outside.
For Direct Path students, thinking in physicalist terms can cause puzzlement in later parts of the inquiry. This confusion reveals itself in several Direct Path questions that arise. Sometimes even advanced students ask whether two or more observers ever see the same thing. The question seems to be about one’s own mind and other minds, and how perceptions arise into awareness. But the question actually assumes a literal spatial layout, for example, with two observer-bodies occupying different positions on this side of a street, and an observed physical object visible over there, across the street. I have even heard nonduality teachers answer this question in a way that retains the physicalist assumption with no attempt to debunk it.
Another example of physicalist assumptions being carried into nonphysical questions comes up with regard to cause and effect. For example even when we think of a thought causing another thought, we usually think that the paradigm case of causality is when one physical object pushes another. This model seems so convincing that we may find ourselves applying physical terms to nonphysical things, such as thoughts. We may think of one thought causing another by touching or pushing it. The Direct Path is structured so that we begin by looking at physicality. If we are able to deconstruct the idea that physical things exist, then this gives us a great advantage when we turn our attention to mental things, and to relations such as causality, time, and space. Being free of the belief in physical matter, we are that much closer to being free of the belief in these nonphysical phenomena as well.
That is, what if physicality simply doesn’t exist in the first place? If we realize this, then all the subsequent aspects of our self-inquiry are much easier.
It turns out that Berkeley is an excellent guide to this kind of investigation. His two dialogue partners discuss the multiple observers question and the physical causes question, and many more.
One reason I am so fond of this book is that I studied it in graduate school with Prof. Colin M. Turbayne, a world-class Berkeley scholar. In the several classes I took with him, Prof. Turbayne was a tireless advocate of Berkeley’s immaterialism. There was one point in the book that gave me more trouble than all the rest. It was in the Third Dialogue where Philonous offers what almost seems like a throwaway line: “Strictly speaking, Hylas, we don’t see the same object that we feel” (p. ). To me, it seemed so obvious that we do see the same object that we feel that I was stumped for about a week. I kept asking questions and Prof. Turbayne answered with great patience. I had “forgotten” what it is that we perceive, according to Berkeley. We don’t perceive physical objects such as spheres and cubes. What we actually perceive is colors and textures. And they are not the same things. This came to me in a flash. At that point the rest of Berkeley’s philosophy snapped into focus for me and made perfect sense. The next day, I rushed into Prof Turbayne’s office and said, “I got it! I finally understand what Berkeley is saying!” He looked at me briefly and replied with a wry grin, “Good. And now go tell others.”
That was about fifteen years before I discovered philosophies like Advaita Vedanta and the Direct Path. But when I did come to these teachings, the non-materialist gestalt had settled quite well. It had actually improved the quality of my life in many ways. Some of these aspects of freedom from materiality are also discussed in this book.
When I encountered the parts of Vedanta and the Direct Path that discuss the physical world, there were no stumbling blocks. My immediate reaction was “Yes, this is my experience.” I never felt prompted to ask about multiple observers or physical causes. By then, my questions were about other things, such as intention, free will, and personal identity. Berkeley is not a resource for these issues. He mentions them, assumes them, but doesn’t deconstruct them. He doesn’t push toward monism or nonduality. I remember Prof. Turbayne explaining this in class. He said that Berkeley was a Christian clergyman for his entire professional life, and didn’t want to go too far. So he refrained from deconstructing the mind the way he deconstructed matter.
I find it amazing that there is so much overlap between Berkeley’s treatment of matter and the Direct Path’s. Berkeley’s work has helped me and many others. I hope you enjoy reading this as much as I enjoyed writing it!
How to Use This Book
Berkeley’s Three Dialogues is a masterful work, both as philosophy and as literature. It is fun and informative to read. If you wish to read the dialogues themselves, turn to Part II. If you wish to follow the examination of the arguments against materialism, then begin with Part I. The Table of Contents can be used to find topics of interest. I have broken the dialogues into numbered sections, according to the topics discussed. The sections in Parts I and II have the same names and numbers, along with the designator (I) or (II), which indicates whether the given section is explanatory (I) or part of Berkeley’s text.
Note on the Text
For the Three Dialogues and several other texts from Berkeley and others, I have used the Early Modern Texts editions. Early Modern Texts (https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/) is the online educational project created by the philosopher Jonathan Bennett (1930–2024). The site contains well-formatted PDF files of many philosophers from the early modern era. They are free to download and have been prepared so as to make them easier to read while retaining the important ideas and arguments. This book contains the full text of the Early Modern Text edition of Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. I chose this edition because of its accessibility and clarity, especially for readers less familiar with eighteenth-century English. Because this edition has an educational focus, Prof. Bennett has added occasional comments and notations to the text. These include explanations and clarifications in square brackets ([]), as well as small bullets (•). The small bullets are used in some sentences to help the eye follow their structure more easily. Small dots (·) indicate material that has been added for clarification. This book is also an educational project. All proceeds go to the Radius Foundation, a registered nonprofit foundation, 501(c)3, which fosters dialogue and the communication of ideas.
Section 1.1 (I) Immaterialism is more reasonable than materialism
In this section, Berkeley seeks to align his immaterialist philosophy with common sense and against skepticism. If we pit the two dialog partners against each other, Hylas (the materialist) and Philonous (the immaterialist), it might seem that Philonous is the skeptic. After all, he is the one who denies the existence of matter. This is what Hylas says. But Berkeley argues that it is actually the other way around. The one who affirms the existence of matter is inevitably led to skepticism.
Hylas: It is indeed somewhat unusual: but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was talking about last night that I couldn’t sleep, so I decided to get up and walk in the garden.
Philonous: That’s good! It gives you a chance to see what innocent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom on the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret raptures.
Hylas is the materialist, the one who believes in the objective existence of physical substance and physical properties that exist independently of all minds. Philonous is the “idealist,” arguing that what we perceive is ideas, not external objects.
But notice that it’s Philonous who is more in touch with things. He is in intimate touch with the season, the sky, the birds, trees, and flowers. Hylas is lost in thought!
This illustrates part of Berkeley’s argument that his philosophy makes the world immediate (what nonduality would call “direct”) for us. If we were to believe, like Hylas, that the true world is made of unthinking, inert substance that can’t be seen, then we would end up feeling separated from it. This sense of separation is inherent in what Philonous calls “skepticism.”
Hyl: I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages, through a desire to mark themselves off from the common people or
through heaven knows what trick of their thought, claimed either to believe nothing at all or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This wouldn’t matter so much if their paradoxes and scepticism didn’t bring consequences that are bad for mankind in general.
This early part of the dialogue establishes a motive for our looking into Berkeley’s ideas. Why should we be interested in them? He positions his philosophy as an antidote to skepticism (Berkeley and Jonathan Bennett spell it the British way, “scepticism”).
Skepticism functions as a bargaining chip in this part of the discussion.
Hylas and Philonous agree upon this: Neither one wants to be branded a skeptic. For this reason, each of them is arguing that his philosophy is further from skepticism.
In the seventeenth century, skepticism had a less favorable reputation than it has now. Back then, when religion was still a powerful force in society, skepticism was associated with atheism and the lack of moral or intellectual standards. Very few people wanted to be thought a skeptic. But today, skepticism is associated with science, and even with the idea that the scientific approach is truer than any alternative account of the world.
Phil: I entirely agree with you about the bad effects of the paraded doubts of some philosophers and the fantastical views of others. I have felt this so strongly in recent times that I have dropped some of the high-flown theories I had learned in their universities, replacing them with ordinary common opinions. Since this revolt of mine against metaphysical notions and in favour of the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I swear that I find I can think ever so much better, so that I can now easily understand many things which previously were mysteries and riddles.
Philonous is positioning his philosophy as common sense, an approach to life that follows the dictates of nature. This is another motivating idea. Most people don’t want a high-flown metaphysical theory.
Phil: I seriously believe that there is no such thing as what philosophers call ‘material substance’; but if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, then I would have the same reason to renounce this belief as I think I have now to reject the contrary opinion.
Philonous is arguing against physical substance. He sees belief in it to cause more skepticism than a lack of belief in it. Why? Because the kind of physical substance that people thought existed objectively in Berkeley’s time was something that we couldn’t perceive directly, but only through its effects on us—that is, through our sensory impressions. It was thought that the idea of physical substance was needed, or else there could be nothing that would explain our experience.
This physical substance was thought at once to be real, and also to be imperceivable.
If we can perceive ideas, but not the external substance that we imagine is needed to cause them, then we are forced into skepticism about whether our ideas and interpretations about physical substance are true. Of course Hylas thinks that Philonous is the skeptic because Philonous doesn’t believe in matter.
Hyl: What! can anything be more fantastical, more in conflict with common sense, or a more obvious piece of scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as matter?
They go back and forth about skepticism for a while. They end up on p. 2 agreeing that skepticism is the distrust of the senses, the denial of sensible things. This allows them to go on to examine just what sensible things are. Is the sensible thing the hot external object that is sensed (as Hylas says)? Or is it the feeling of painful heat (as Philonous says)?